
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Danger strong hits: 108 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 3 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +30 | |
| Burst: 14 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 49 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 26 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 47 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 | |
| Burst: 48 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 113 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 2 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +20 | |
| Burst: 50 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 282 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 811 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 15 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 52 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 61 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 91 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger strong hits: 349 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 822 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 11 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 38 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 194.61.40.25: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
IP 194.61.40.25 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
194.61.40.25 has been assigned a threat score of 255/100 (Critical). This places it in the critical threat category. Immediate blocking is strongly advised across all network perimeters.
The following attack categories were identified:
Network traffic from 194.61.40.25, located in New Delhi, India, operating on the network of GSL Networks Pty LTD, has been classified as malicious by our automated threat scoring engine. Our sensors captured 7 malicious requests from this address across a 63-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~0.1 requests per day. Classified as a VPN or proxy server, this IP serves as an anonymization layer. While VPNs have legitimate uses, this address has been observed routing clearly malicious traffic. The dual attack vectors of User-Agent Anomaly combined with Request Flooding indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. India currently accounts for 31 blocked IPs in our database, making it a notable source of malicious traffic. With a threat score of 255/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.