
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Danger strong hits: 21 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 61 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 14 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 49 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 14 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 56 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 50 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 108 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 3 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +30 | |
| Danger strong hits: 310 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 534 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 15 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 51 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 | |
| Burst: 52 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 75 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 9 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 31 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 5 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 24 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 29 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 194.61.40.11 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
IP 194.61.40.11 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
194.61.40.11 has been assigned a threat score of 255/100 (Critical). This places it in the critical threat category. Immediate blocking is strongly advised across all network perimeters.
The following attack categories were identified:
Threat intelligence analysis has linked 194.61.40.11 to malicious activity originating from New Delhi, India, operating on the network of GSL Networks Pty LTD. The address has been under observation since its initial detection. Over a period of 11 days, this IP generated 9 malicious requests, averaging approximately 0.8 requests per day. Classified as a VPN or proxy server, this IP serves as an anonymization layer. While VPNs have legitimate uses, this address has been observed routing clearly malicious traffic. The dual attack vectors of User-Agent Anomaly combined with Request Flooding indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. With 31 flagged addresses, India represents a notable presence in our threat database. A score of 255/100 places this address in the top tier of severity. Block and investigate any historical connections.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Edge computing pushes processing closer to users but expands the attack surface. Edge nodes often run in less secure environments than centralized data centers, creating new opportunities for physical access attacks and supply chain compromises.