
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Danger strong hits: 108 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 3 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +30 | |
| Burst: 14 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 50 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 15 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 72 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 13 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 45 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 220 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 585 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 15 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 51 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 32 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 146 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger strong hits: 146 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 348 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 52 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 194.61.40.13: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 194.61.40.13.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
194.61.40.13 has been assigned a threat score of 255/100 (Critical). This is a critical-level threat. Systems administrators should treat this IP as hostile and block all inbound connections without exception.
The following attack categories were identified:
Network traffic from 194.61.40.13, located in New Delhi, India, operating on the network of GSL Networks Pty LTD, has been classified as malicious by our automated threat scoring engine. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 5 flagged requests at a rate of ~5/day. Classified as a VPN or proxy server, this IP serves as an anonymization layer. While VPNs have legitimate uses, this address has been observed routing clearly malicious traffic. Two attack patterns were identified (User-Agent Anomaly and Request Flooding), suggesting a semi-automated campaign that targets multiple vulnerabilities. Our records show 31 malicious IPs originating from India, positioning it as a notable contributor to global threat activity. A score of 255/100 places this address in the top tier of severity. Block and investigate any historical connections.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Examining HTTP headers beyond User-Agent reveals attack tools and automated scripts. Missing standard headers, unusual ordering, non-standard values, and inconsistencies with claimed client identity all serve as reliable detection signals.
Credential stuffing uses stolen username-password pairs from data breaches to attempt logins across many websites. Since users frequently reuse passwords, these automated attacks achieve success rates of 0.1-2%, which translates to thousands of compromised accounts from millions of attempts.