
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Directory Scan | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +0 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block 192.42.116.143 at the network perimeter. Implement defense-in-depth combining IP blocking with application-layer protections.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
192.42.116.143 has been assigned a threat score of 65/100 (High). The IP is rated as a high-level threat. Network administrators should implement blocking rules and monitor for any connections from this address.
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 192.42.116.143, geolocated to Amsterdam, Netherlands, operating on the network of Church of Cyberology, as a source of suspicious network activity. During its 25-day observation window, we recorded 534 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 21.4 per day on average. The address operates as a VPN/proxy exit node. Attackers route traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their real location and evade IP-based security controls. With 122 flagged addresses, Netherlands represents a significant presence in our threat database. At 65/100, this IP presents a meaningful threat. Implement rate limiting with escalation to blocking.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Credential stuffing uses stolen username-password pairs from data breaches to attempt logins across many websites. Since users frequently reuse passwords, these automated attacks achieve success rates of 0.1-2%, which translates to thousands of compromised accounts from millions of attempts.
Internet traffic routing through a limited number of submarine cables and exchange points creates natural chokepoints. Understanding these routing patterns helps explain geographic clustering of certain attack types and latency-based scanning behaviors.