
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burst 15/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 6/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 192.42.116.97 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
192.42.116.97 has been assigned a threat score of 80/100 (Critical). This is a critical-level threat. Systems administrators should treat this IP as hostile and block all inbound connections without exception.
The following attack categories were identified:
Threat intelligence analysis has linked 192.42.116.97 to malicious activity originating from Amsterdam, Netherlands, operating on the network of Church of Cyberology. The address has been under observation since its initial detection. The address has been active for 4 days in our monitoring system, producing 326 flagged requests at a rate of ~81.5/day. This IP is identified as a VPN or proxy endpoint, commonly used to mask the true origin of attack traffic and bypass geographic or reputation-based blocking. The IP is engaged in request flooding, sending traffic at rates designed to exhaust server capacity. Netherlands currently accounts for 122 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. At 80/100, this IP warrants immediate defensive action.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
Botnet C2 infrastructure has evolved from centralized IRC channels to resilient peer-to-peer networks, domain generation algorithms, and blockchain-based communication. This evolution makes botnet takedowns increasingly difficult and expensive.