
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burst 6/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| POST seen | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +8 | |
| UA changed | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 82.158.193.165.
Address UA spoofing from 82.158.193.165: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
82.158.193.165 has been assigned a threat score of 78/100 (High). At this threat level, the IP is considered high risk. Firewall rules should be updated to deny traffic from this source.
The following attack categories were identified:
82.158.193.165 is registered in Vancouver, Canada, operating on the network of VPS USA. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. During its 1-day observation window, we recorded 35 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 35 per day on average. This address belongs to a datacenter or cloud hosting provider. Hosting IPs are frequently leveraged by threat actors who rent cheap VPS instances specifically for conducting attacks. The dual attack vectors of Request Flooding combined with User-Agent Anomaly indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. Our records show 2,611 malicious IPs originating from Canada, positioning it as a major contributor to global threat activity. At 78/100, this IP warrants immediate defensive action.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
Race conditions occur when application behavior depends on the timing of concurrent operations. Attackers exploit these timing windows to bypass limits, duplicate transactions, or escalate privileges by sending carefully timed parallel requests.