
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Danger strong hits: 3 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +75 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| UA bot: Go-http-client | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 | |
| Danger strong hits: 4 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 4 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +40 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| POST requests present | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +8 | |
| Danger strong hits: 23 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 6 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger strong hits: 17 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 2 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +20 | |
| Danger strong hits: 6 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 12 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 5 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 213.111.157.32 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
IP 213.111.157.32 is enumerating directories. Configure fail2ban apache-404 jail after 10+ 404 errors. Disable directory listings. Normalize all 404 responses.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 213.111.157.32.
Network reconnaissance data from Shodan. Open ports may indicate running services, misconfigurations, or potential attack surfaces.
| Port | Service | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | SSH | Low | Secure Shell — common brute force target for remote access |
Data source: Shodan InternetDB. Scanned independently of abuse.mom.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
213.111.157.32 has been assigned a threat score of 293/100 (Critical). This represents a critical risk level. Our detection systems have flagged multiple high-confidence indicators of malicious intent from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
213.111.157.32 is registered in Singapore, Singapore, operating on the network of Trunk-Networks. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. Over a period of 4 days, this IP generated 10 malicious requests, averaging approximately 2.5 requests per day. The address is classified as residential, meaning it likely belongs to an end-user ISP connection. Malicious activity from residential IPs typically indicates device compromise or botnet membership. With 3 different attack patterns detected, this IP exhibits behavior characteristic of advanced automated scanning frameworks. With 208 flagged addresses, Singapore represents a significant presence in our threat database. With a threat score of 293/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
Examining HTTP headers beyond User-Agent reveals attack tools and automated scripts. Missing standard headers, unusual ordering, non-standard values, and inconsistencies with claimed client identity all serve as reliable detection signals.
Race conditions occur when application behavior depends on the timing of concurrent operations. Attackers exploit these timing windows to bypass limits, duplicate transactions, or escalate privileges by sending carefully timed parallel requests.