
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burst 7/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| UA changed | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
We have detected 4 malicious IPs from this autonomous system.
IP 31.173.100.50 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
Address UA spoofing from 31.173.100.50: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
31.173.100.50 has been assigned a threat score of 70/100 (High). At this threat level, the IP is considered high risk. Firewall rules should be updated to deny traffic from this source.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 31.173.100.50 originates from Yekaterinburg, Russia, operating on the network of Ural Branch of OJSC MegaFon GPRS/UMTS Network. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. The address has been active for 4 days in our monitoring system, producing 122 flagged requests at a rate of ~30.5/day. The address belongs to a mobile carrier network. The sustained pattern of malicious requests indicates either a compromised device or deliberate abuse. The dual attack vectors of Request Flooding combined with User-Agent Anomaly indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. Our records show 2,651 malicious IPs originating from Russia, positioning it as a major contributor to global threat activity. The score of 70/100 indicates a confirmed malicious actor. Network-level blocking is appropriate.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
Botnet C2 infrastructure has evolved from centralized IRC channels to resilient peer-to-peer networks, domain generation algorithms, and blockchain-based communication. This evolution makes botnet takedowns increasingly difficult and expensive.