
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burst 21/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 33/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| UA changed | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 83.169.216.201.
Address UA spoofing from 83.169.216.201: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
83.169.216.201 has been assigned a threat score of 105/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
Network traffic from 83.169.216.201, located in Yekaterinburg, Russia, operating on the network of PJSC MegaFon, has been classified as malicious by our automated threat scoring engine. Our sensors captured 299 malicious requests from this address across a 3-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~99.7 requests per day. This is a mobile network IP. While mobile addresses are typically shared via CGNAT, persistent malicious activity from this specific address suggests automated abuse. Two attack patterns were identified (Request Flooding and User-Agent Anomaly), suggesting a semi-automated campaign that targets multiple vulnerabilities. Russia currently accounts for 101 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. At 105/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
Internet traffic routing through a limited number of submarine cables and exchange points creates natural chokepoints. Understanding these routing patterns helps explain geographic clustering of certain attack types and latency-based scanning behaviors.