
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Burst: 141 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 141 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 200 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 200 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 8 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| UA suspicious | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 185.225.33.52: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 185.225.33.52.
IP 185.225.33.52 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
Network reconnaissance data from Shodan. Open ports may indicate running services, misconfigurations, or potential attack surfaces.
| Port | Service | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | SSH | Low | Secure Shell — common brute force target for remote access |
| 80 | HTTP | Low | HTTP web server — standard web traffic |
| CVE ID | Link |
|---|---|
| CVE-2023-51767 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-26465 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-32728 | NVD → |
| CVE-2024-6387 | NVD → |
| CVE-2007-2768 | NVD → |
| CVE-2008-3844 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-26466 | NVD → |
🔴 Security scanning identified 7 vulnerability entries on this host. Multiple vulnerabilities suggest gaps in patch management. Consult NVD advisories for details.
Data source: Shodan InternetDB. Scanned independently of abuse.mom.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
185.225.33.52 has been assigned a threat score of 150/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 185.225.33.52 has been traced to St Petersburg, Russia, operating on the network of BEGET.RU. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. The address has been active for 89 days in our monitoring system, producing 377 flagged requests at a rate of ~4.2/day. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. The diversity of 3 separate attack methods suggests a comprehensive attack toolkit — likely an automated scanner that tests for vulnerabilities across multiple categories. Russia currently accounts for 120 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. A score of 150/100 places this address in the top tier of severity. Block and investigate any historical connections.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.