
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 141 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 141 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 185.225.33.12 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
Block scanning from 185.225.33.12: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
IP 185.225.33.12 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
Network reconnaissance data from Shodan. Open ports may indicate running services, misconfigurations, or potential attack surfaces.
| Port | Service | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 21 | FTP | Medium | File Transfer Protocol — often targeted for anonymous login attacks |
| 22 | SSH | Low | Secure Shell — common brute force target for remote access |
| 80 | HTTP | Low | HTTP web server — standard web traffic |
⚠️ Network scanning reveals 1 dangerous service exposed on 185.225.33.12. These services should not be publicly accessible without strict firewall rules.
| CVE ID | Link |
|---|---|
| CVE-2008-3844 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-26465 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-26466 | NVD → |
| CVE-2023-51767 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-32728 | NVD → |
| CVE-2007-2768 | NVD → |
| CVE-2024-6387 | NVD → |
🔴 This host has 7 known CVEs associated with its exposed services. Multiple vulnerabilities suggest gaps in patch management. Review each CVE in the NVD database.
Data source: Shodan InternetDB. Scanned independently of abuse.mom.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
185.225.33.12 has been assigned a threat score of 150/100 (Critical). This places it in the critical threat category. Immediate blocking is strongly advised across all network perimeters.
The following attack categories were identified:
185.225.33.12 is registered in St Petersburg, Russia, operating on the network of BEGET.RU. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. Our sensors captured 1 malicious requests from this address across a 1-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~1 requests per day. Operating from datacenter infrastructure, this IP is typical of addresses used in organized attack operations. Cloud and VPS providers are commonly exploited as launching platforms for automated scanning. With 3 different attack patterns detected, this IP exhibits behavior characteristic of advanced automated scanning frameworks. Russia currently accounts for 120 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. With a threat score of 150/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Effective rate limiting must balance protection against abuse with allowing legitimate traffic bursts. Sliding window algorithms, token buckets, and adaptive thresholds based on client reputation provide layered defense against flooding attacks.