
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| UA bot: curl | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 157.22.16.108 is enumerating directories. Configure fail2ban apache-404 jail after 10+ 404 errors. Disable directory listings. Normalize all 404 responses.
IP 157.22.16.108 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
157.22.16.108 has been assigned a threat score of 65/100 (High). This score indicates high threat severity. The IP has shown clear patterns of malicious behavior that warrant immediate defensive measures.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 157.22.16.108 has been traced to Neath, United Kingdom, operating on the network of Global Transit Systems LLC. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. Over a period of 1 days, this IP generated 57 malicious requests, averaging approximately 57 requests per day. The address operates as a VPN/proxy exit node. Attackers route traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their real location and evade IP-based security controls. Two attack patterns were identified (Path Enumeration and User-Agent Anomaly), suggesting a semi-automated campaign that targets multiple vulnerabilities. At 65/100, this IP presents a meaningful threat. Implement rate limiting with escalation to blocking.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
RCE vulnerabilities allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on target servers. These critical flaws often arise from deserialization bugs, template injection, or file upload vulnerabilities, and represent the highest severity class of web application weaknesses.