
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| UA bot: curl | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 157.22.127.57: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Address UA spoofing from 157.22.127.57: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
157.22.127.57 has been assigned a threat score of 65/100 (High). At this threat level, the IP is considered high risk. Firewall rules should be updated to deny traffic from this source.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 157.22.127.57 originates from Cwmfelinfach, United Kingdom, operating on the network of Global Transit Systems LLC. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. Our sensors captured 78 malicious requests from this address across a 3-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~26 requests per day. The address operates as a VPN/proxy exit node. Attackers route traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their real location and evade IP-based security controls. The dual attack vectors of Path Enumeration combined with User-Agent Anomaly indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. The score of 65/100 warrants active monitoring and rate-limiting. Full blocking is advisable for sensitive systems.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Monitoring DNS queries reveals malicious activity including command-and-control communication, data exfiltration through DNS tunneling, and connections to known malicious domains. DNS is often the first indicator of compromise in network forensics.