
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Probe 302→404 | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| UA changed | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 93.150.239.201 is enumerating directories. Configure fail2ban apache-404 jail after 10+ 404 errors. Disable directory listings. Normalize all 404 responses.
Address UA spoofing from 93.150.239.201: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
93.150.239.201 has been assigned a threat score of 70/100 (High). This classifies it as a high-severity threat. Proactive blocking is recommended for sensitive infrastructure.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 93.150.239.201 has been traced to Padua, Italy, operating on the network of VODAFONE. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. Over a period of 4 days, this IP generated 356 malicious requests, averaging approximately 89 requests per day. This is a mobile network IP. While mobile addresses are typically shared via CGNAT, persistent malicious activity from this specific address suggests automated abuse. Two attack patterns were identified (Path Enumeration and User-Agent Anomaly), suggesting a semi-automated campaign that targets multiple vulnerabilities. Our records show 103 malicious IPs originating from Italy, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. At 70/100, this IP warrants immediate defensive action.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Cross-Origin Resource Sharing misconfigurations can expose sensitive APIs to unauthorized origins. Wildcard policies, reflected origins, and null origin allowlisting create vulnerabilities that attackers exploit for data theft and unauthorized actions.