
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger strong hits: 1 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +25 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 85.8.130.88: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
85.8.130.88 has been assigned a threat score of 60/100 (High). At this threat level, the IP is considered high risk. Firewall rules should be updated to deny traffic from this source.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 85.8.130.88 originates from Seattle, United States, operating on the network of F.N.S. HOLDINGS LIMITED. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 1 flagged requests at a rate of ~1/day. Classified as a VPN or proxy server, this IP serves as an anonymization layer. While VPNs have legitimate uses, this address has been observed routing clearly malicious traffic. Active path scanning has been detected — this IP probes for hundreds of common file and directory names. United States currently accounts for 149 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. The score of 60/100 warrants active monitoring and rate-limiting. Full blocking is advisable for sensitive systems.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.
Credential stuffing uses stolen username-password pairs from data breaches to attempt logins across many websites. Since users frequently reuse passwords, these automated attacks achieve success rates of 0.1-2%, which translates to thousands of compromised accounts from millions of attempts.