
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA bot: Go-http-client | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Danger strong hits: 48 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 80 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 8 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 28 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 194 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 283 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Burst: 30 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 314 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 285 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Burst: 9 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 24 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 24 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 41 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 5 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 16 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 160 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 244 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 15 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 85.203.23.10: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
IP 85.203.23.10 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
IP 85.203.23.10 is enumerating directories. Configure fail2ban apache-404 jail after 10+ 404 errors. Disable directory listings. Normalize all 404 responses.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
85.203.23.10 has been assigned a threat score of 290/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 85.203.23.10 has been traced to Singapore, Singapore, operating on the network of GSL Networks Pty LTD. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. During its 40-day observation window, we recorded 8 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 0.2 per day on average. Classified as a VPN or proxy server, this IP serves as an anonymization layer. While VPNs have legitimate uses, this address has been observed routing clearly malicious traffic. The combination of 3 distinct attack vectors indicates a sophisticated, multi-pronged threat actor deploying automated tools that probe multiple attack surfaces simultaneously. With 208 flagged addresses, Singapore represents a significant presence in our threat database. A score of 290/100 places this address in the top tier of severity. Block and investigate any historical connections.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
Processing IP addresses for security purposes under GDPR requires balancing legitimate interest in network protection with data minimization principles. Threat intelligence platforms must implement appropriate retention policies and provide mechanisms for data subject rights.