
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA bot: curl | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 | |
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 82.27.19.3 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
Block scanning from 82.27.19.3: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
82.27.19.3 has been assigned a threat score of 80/100 (Critical). This places it in the critical threat category. Immediate blocking is strongly advised across all network perimeters.
The following attack categories were identified:
82.27.19.3 is registered in Stockholm, Sweden, operating on the network of Tele2 Sverige AB. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 1 flagged requests at a rate of ~1/day. The address belongs to a mobile carrier network. The sustained pattern of malicious requests indicates either a compromised device or deliberate abuse. The dual attack vectors of User-Agent Anomaly combined with Path Enumeration indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. Sweden currently accounts for 109 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. At 80/100, this IP warrants immediate defensive action.
Examining HTTP headers beyond User-Agent reveals attack tools and automated scripts. Missing standard headers, unusual ordering, non-standard values, and inconsistencies with claimed client identity all serve as reliable detection signals.
Botnet C2 infrastructure has evolved from centralized IRC channels to resilient peer-to-peer networks, domain generation algorithms, and blockchain-based communication. This evolution makes botnet takedowns increasingly difficult and expensive.