
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Burst 33/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 33/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 34/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 34/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 60/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 62/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 62/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 63/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 63/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 92/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 92/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 94/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 94/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 95/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 95/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 4 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +40 | |
| Danger medium hits: 8 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger strong hits: 11 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 16 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 6 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| POST seen | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +8 | |
| UA bot: Go-http-client | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 81.171.72.93: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 81.171.72.93.
Address UA spoofing from 81.171.72.93: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
81.171.72.93 has been assigned a threat score of 288/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 81.171.72.93 originates from Berlin, Germany, operating on the network of Eweka Internet Services B.V.. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. Our sensors captured 6,770 malicious requests from this address across a 25-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~270.8 requests per day. Classified as a VPN or proxy server, this IP serves as an anonymization layer. While VPNs have legitimate uses, this address has been observed routing clearly malicious traffic. With 3 different attack patterns detected, this IP exhibits behavior characteristic of advanced automated scanning frameworks. With 107 flagged addresses, Germany represents a significant presence in our threat database. With a threat score of 288/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
SSH servers face constant brute force attacks targeting common usernames and weak passwords. Key-based authentication, fail2ban, non-standard ports, and IP allowlisting dramatically reduce the attack surface. Monitoring auth logs reveals active campaigns and compromised credentials.