
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 1 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +25 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 | |
| Danger strong hits: 3 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +75 | |
| Danger medium hits: 76 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 61 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 114 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 114 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 56 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| Danger medium hits: 2 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +20 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 59 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 76 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 4 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 55 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 152 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 60 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 77 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 108 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 144 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 74.248.131.192 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
IP 74.248.131.192 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
IP 74.248.131.192 is enumerating directories. Configure fail2ban apache-404 jail after 10+ 404 errors. Disable directory listings. Normalize all 404 responses.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
74.248.131.192 has been assigned a threat score of 255/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 74.248.131.192 has been traced to Warsaw, Poland, operating on the network of Microsoft Corporation. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. Over a period of 1 days, this IP generated 15 malicious requests, averaging approximately 15 requests per day. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. The diversity of 3 separate attack methods suggests a comprehensive attack toolkit — likely an automated scanner that tests for vulnerabilities across multiple categories. Poland currently accounts for 102 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. A score of 255/100 places this address in the top tier of severity. Block and investigate any historical connections.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Examining HTTP headers beyond User-Agent reveals attack tools and automated scripts. Missing standard headers, unusual ordering, non-standard values, and inconsistencies with claimed client identity all serve as reliable detection signals.
Command injection occurs when attackers insert operating system commands through application inputs. Successful exploitation grants direct server access, enabling data theft, malware installation, and lateral movement across networks.