
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Burst 15/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 20/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 10 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 12 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 14 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 16 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 18 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| Danger strong hits: 20 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 22 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 24 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 26 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 28 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 30 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 32 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 34 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 36 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 38 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 4 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 40 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 42 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 44 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 46 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 48 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 50 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 52 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 54 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 56 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 58 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 6 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 60 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 62 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 64 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 66 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 68 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 70 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 72 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger strong hits: 8 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| Probe 302→404 | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| UA suspicious | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 68.168.223.135: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 68.168.223.135.
IP 68.168.223.135 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
68.168.223.135 has been assigned a threat score of 150/100 (Critical). This is a critical-level threat. Systems administrators should treat this IP as hostile and block all inbound connections without exception.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 68.168.223.135, geolocated to Paterson, United States, operating on the network of Interserver, as a source of suspicious network activity. The address has been active for 15 days in our monitoring system, producing 1,377 flagged requests at a rate of ~91.8/day. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. The combination of 3 distinct attack vectors indicates a sophisticated, multi-pronged threat actor deploying automated tools that probe multiple attack surfaces simultaneously. United States currently accounts for 21 blocked IPs in our database, making it a notable source of malicious traffic. At 150/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
DNS amplification exploits open resolvers to reflect and amplify traffic toward victims. A small query triggers a large response directed at the spoofed source IP, achieving amplification factors of 50x or more, overwhelming target bandwidth.