
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Danger medium hits: 3 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +30 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| Probe 302→404 | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 5.37.112.23: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
5.37.112.23 has been assigned a threat score of 75/100 (High). The IP is rated as a high-level threat. Network administrators should implement blocking rules and monitor for any connections from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 5.37.112.23 originates from Muscat, OM, operating on the network of Oman Telecommunications Company (S.A.O.G). It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. The address has been active for 2 days in our monitoring system, producing 330 flagged requests at a rate of ~165/day. The address belongs to a mobile carrier network. The sustained pattern of malicious requests indicates either a compromised device or deliberate abuse. Active path scanning has been detected — this IP probes for hundreds of common file and directory names. With 107 flagged addresses, OM represents a significant presence in our threat database. A threat score of 75/100 places this IP in the high-risk category. Blocking at the firewall level is recommended.
Path traversal attacks attempt to access files outside the intended directory by manipulating file path references. Attackers use sequences like ../ to reach sensitive system files such as /etc/passwd or application configuration files.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.