
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Danger strong hits: 378 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 970 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 54 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 185 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 45.86.200.103: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
IP 45.86.200.103 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
45.86.200.103 has been assigned a threat score of 255/100 (Critical). This represents a critical risk level. Our detection systems have flagged multiple high-confidence indicators of malicious intent from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
45.86.200.103 is registered in The Hague, Netherlands, operating on the network of F.N.S. HOLDINGS LIMITED. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 1 flagged requests at a rate of ~1/day. The address operates as a VPN/proxy exit node. Attackers route traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their real location and evade IP-based security controls. The dual attack vectors of User-Agent Anomaly combined with Request Flooding indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. Our records show 107 malicious IPs originating from Netherlands, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. A score of 255/100 places this address in the top tier of severity. Block and investigate any historical connections.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
Effective rate limiting must balance protection against abuse with allowing legitimate traffic bursts. Sliding window algorithms, token buckets, and adaptive thresholds based on client reputation provide layered defense against flooding attacks.