
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger medium hits: 9 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| UA bot: Go-http-client | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 45.133.7.144: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
45.133.7.144 has been assigned a threat score of 100/100 (Critical). This places it in the critical threat category. Immediate blocking is strongly advised across all network perimeters.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 45.133.7.144, geolocated to Auckland, NZ, operating on the network of VPN, as a source of suspicious network activity. The address has been active for 4 days in our monitoring system, producing 179 flagged requests at a rate of ~44.8/day. Classified as a VPN or proxy server, this IP serves as an anonymization layer. While VPNs have legitimate uses, this address has been observed routing clearly malicious traffic. The IP exhibits User-Agent manipulation, switching between different browser identities or sending empty headers. NZ currently accounts for 64 blocked IPs in our database, making it a notable source of malicious traffic. With a threat score of 100/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.
Email authentication protocols work together to prevent spoofing. SPF validates sending servers, DKIM provides cryptographic message signing, and DMARC defines enforcement policies. Full implementation significantly reduces phishing effectiveness.