
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 45.131.194.115: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
45.131.194.115 has been assigned a threat score of 75/100 (High). This score indicates high threat severity. The IP has shown clear patterns of malicious behavior that warrant immediate defensive measures.
The following attack categories were identified:
Network traffic from 45.131.194.115, located in San Francisco, United States, operating on the network of VPN, has been classified as malicious by our automated threat scoring engine. During its 1-day observation window, we recorded 1 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 1 per day on average. Classified as a VPN or proxy server, this IP serves as an anonymization layer. While VPNs have legitimate uses, this address has been observed routing clearly malicious traffic. The IP exhibits User-Agent manipulation, switching between different browser identities or sending empty headers. Our records show 141 malicious IPs originating from United States, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. At 75/100, this IP warrants immediate defensive action.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Certificate Transparency logs record all publicly trusted TLS certificates. Monitoring these logs reveals unauthorized certificate issuance, phishing domain preparation, and shadow IT — providing early warning of attacks targeting an organizations domain.