
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger strong hits: 1 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +25 | |
| UA bot: python | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 45.130.203.148 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
45.130.203.148 has been assigned a threat score of 65/100 (High). This score indicates high threat severity. The IP has shown clear patterns of malicious behavior that warrant immediate defensive measures.
The following attack categories were identified:
Threat intelligence analysis has linked 45.130.203.148 to malicious activity originating from Aïn Taya, DZ, operating on the network of GSL Networks Pty LTD. The address has been under observation since its initial detection. Over a period of 11 days, this IP generated 515 malicious requests, averaging approximately 46.8 requests per day. This is a residential IP address, suggesting a compromised home device such as a router, smart appliance, or infected workstation participating in a botnet. Detected suspicious User-Agent anomalies including empty, forged, or rapidly rotating UA strings — characteristic of automated scanning tools. With 151 flagged addresses, DZ represents a significant presence in our threat database. The score of 65/100 warrants active monitoring and rate-limiting. Full blocking is advisable for sensitive systems.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
Command injection occurs when attackers insert operating system commands through application inputs. Successful exploitation grants direct server access, enabling data theft, malware installation, and lateral movement across networks.
Examining HTTP headers beyond User-Agent reveals attack tools and automated scripts. Missing standard headers, unusual ordering, non-standard values, and inconsistencies with claimed client identity all serve as reliable detection signals.