
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 28 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 264 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 45 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 148 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 42 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 352 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 70 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 200 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 14 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 176 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 56 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 178 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 263 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 43 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 132 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 21 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 48 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 4.233.60.59: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 4.233.60.59.
Block scanning from 4.233.60.59: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
4.233.60.59 has been assigned a threat score of 280/100 (Critical). With this rating, the IP falls into the critical severity bracket — among the most dangerous addresses in our monitoring database.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 4.233.60.59 has been traced to Paris, France, operating on the network of Microsoft Corporation. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 5 flagged requests at a rate of ~5/day. Classified as a hosting IP, this address likely runs on a rented server or cloud instance. Attackers prefer datacenter IPs for their high bandwidth and disposable nature. The combination of 3 distinct attack vectors indicates a sophisticated, multi-pronged threat actor deploying automated tools that probe multiple attack surfaces simultaneously. With 201 flagged addresses, France represents a significant presence in our threat database. A score of 280/100 places this address in the top tier of severity. Block and investigate any historical connections.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
SSRF attacks trick servers into making requests to internal resources that should not be publicly accessible. This can expose cloud metadata endpoints, internal APIs, and private network services, potentially leading to full infrastructure compromise.