
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 231 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 684 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 22 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 75 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 332 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 685 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 76 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 226 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 618 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 23 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 77 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 447 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1018 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 74 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 91 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 184 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 19 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 59 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 4.204.218.1: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Block scanning from 4.204.218.1: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 4.204.218.1.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
4.204.218.1 has been assigned a threat score of 280/100 (Critical). This is a critical-level threat. Systems administrators should treat this IP as hostile and block all inbound connections without exception.
The following attack categories were identified:
4.204.218.1 is registered in Toronto, Canada, operating on the network of Microsoft Corporation. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 5 flagged requests at a rate of ~5/day. This address belongs to a datacenter or cloud hosting provider. Hosting IPs are frequently leveraged by threat actors who rent cheap VPS instances specifically for conducting attacks. The combination of 3 distinct attack vectors indicates a sophisticated, multi-pronged threat actor deploying automated tools that probe multiple attack surfaces simultaneously. With 101 flagged addresses, Canada represents a significant presence in our threat database. At 280/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Expired, self-signed, or misconfigured TLS certificates create security vulnerabilities and trust issues. Certificate monitoring, automated renewal through ACME protocols, and proper certificate chain configuration prevent both security gaps and service disruptions.