
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 120 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 291 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 22 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 79 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 180 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 24 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 85 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 176 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 277 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 23 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 64 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 164 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 81 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 183 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 339 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 86 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 244 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 512 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 87 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 4.204.186.15: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
IP 4.204.186.15 is enumerating directories. Configure fail2ban apache-404 jail after 10+ 404 errors. Disable directory listings. Normalize all 404 responses.
IP 4.204.186.15 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
4.204.186.15 has been assigned a threat score of 280/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
Threat intelligence analysis has linked 4.204.186.15 to malicious activity originating from Toronto, Canada, operating on the network of Microsoft Corporation. The address has been under observation since its initial detection. During its 1-day observation window, we recorded 10 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 10 per day on average. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. With 3 different attack patterns detected, this IP exhibits behavior characteristic of advanced automated scanning frameworks. Canada currently accounts for 101 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. With a threat score of 280/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.