
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Danger medium hits: 4 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +40 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 14 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 14 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| Burst: 12 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 10 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 11 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 13 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 35.231.146.248: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Block scanning from 35.231.146.248: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
IP 35.231.146.248 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
Network reconnaissance data from Shodan. Open ports may indicate running services, misconfigurations, or potential attack surfaces.
| Port | Service | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | SSH | Low | Secure Shell — common brute force target for remote access |
Data source: Shodan InternetDB. Scanned independently of abuse.mom.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
35.231.146.248 has been assigned a threat score of 180/100 (Critical). With this rating, the IP falls into the critical severity bracket — among the most dangerous addresses in our monitoring database.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 35.231.146.248 has been traced to North Charleston, United States, operating on the network of Google LLC. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 89 flagged requests at a rate of ~89/day. This address belongs to a datacenter or cloud hosting provider. Hosting IPs are frequently leveraged by threat actors who rent cheap VPS instances specifically for conducting attacks. The combination of 3 distinct attack vectors indicates a sophisticated, multi-pronged threat actor deploying automated tools that probe multiple attack surfaces simultaneously. United States currently accounts for 142 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. With a threat score of 180/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
GraphQL APIs introduce specific vulnerabilities including introspection information disclosure, query complexity attacks, batching abuse, and authorization bypass through nested queries. Depth limiting, cost analysis, and field-level authorization address these GraphQL-specific threats.