
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burst 11/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 17/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
We have detected 1486 malicious IPs from this autonomous system.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 3.236.18.83.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
3.236.18.83 has been assigned a threat score of 80/100 (Critical). This places it in the critical threat category. Immediate blocking is strongly advised across all network perimeters.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 3.236.18.83 has been traced to Ashburn, United States, operating on the network of Amazon Technologies Inc.. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. Our sensors captured 203 malicious requests from this address across a 2-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~101.5 requests per day. Classified as a hosting IP, this address likely runs on a rented server or cloud instance. Attackers prefer datacenter IPs for their high bandwidth and disposable nature. Rate-based attacks from this IP aim to overwhelm server resources through high-volume request flooding. United States currently accounts for 36,536 blocked IPs in our database, making it a major source of malicious traffic. The score of 80/100 indicates a confirmed malicious actor. Network-level blocking is appropriate.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
Effective rate limiting must balance protection against abuse with allowing legitimate traffic bursts. Sliding window algorithms, token buckets, and adaptive thresholds based on client reputation provide layered defense against flooding attacks.