
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 23.94.155.123: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
23.94.155.123 has been assigned a threat score of 75/100 (High). This classifies it as a high-severity threat. Proactive blocking is recommended for sensitive infrastructure.
The following attack categories were identified:
Threat intelligence analysis has linked 23.94.155.123 to malicious activity originating from Miami, United States, operating on the network of Internet Utilities NA LLC. The address has been under observation since its initial detection. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 1 flagged requests at a rate of ~1/day. Operating from a residential network, this IP may represent a compromised home gateway or IoT device that has been drafted into a larger attack infrastructure. The IP exhibits User-Agent manipulation, switching between different browser identities or sending empty headers. United States currently accounts for 221 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. At 75/100, this IP warrants immediate defensive action.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Botnet C2 infrastructure has evolved from centralized IRC channels to resilient peer-to-peer networks, domain generation algorithms, and blockchain-based communication. This evolution makes botnet takedowns increasingly difficult and expensive.