
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA bot: node-fetch | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 217.116.58.113: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
217.116.58.113 has been assigned a threat score of 50/100 (Medium). At this threat level, the IP demonstrates moderate malicious intent. It may be part of a larger scanning campaign or early-stage reconnaissance.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 217.116.58.113 originates from Tyumen, Russia, operating on the network of Russian company LLC. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. Over a period of 1 days, this IP generated 1 malicious requests, averaging approximately 1 requests per day. This is a residential IP address, suggesting a compromised home device such as a router, smart appliance, or infected workstation participating in a botnet. The IP exhibits User-Agent manipulation, switching between different browser identities or sending empty headers. Our records show 122 malicious IPs originating from Russia, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. The score of 50/100 warrants active monitoring and rate-limiting. Full blocking is advisable for sensitive systems.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Bulletproof hosting providers deliberately ignore abuse complaints, creating safe havens for malicious operations. These providers often operate in jurisdictions with weak cybercrime enforcement, offering services specifically marketed to criminal organizations.