
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| POST seen | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +8 | |
| UA bot: python | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 | |
| UA changed | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 210.94.229.147: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
210.94.229.147 has been assigned a threat score of 73/100 (High). The IP is rated as a high-level threat. Network administrators should implement blocking rules and monitor for any connections from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 210.94.229.147, geolocated to Guri-si, South Korea, operating on the network of Sahmyook University, as a source of suspicious network activity. Our sensors captured 106 malicious requests from this address across a 3-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~35.3 requests per day. This residential IP is likely a compromised consumer device. Home routers and IoT equipment with default credentials are prime targets for botnet operators. The IP exhibits User-Agent manipulation, switching between different browser identities or sending empty headers. Our records show 101 malicious IPs originating from South Korea, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. At 73/100, this IP warrants immediate defensive action.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Email authentication protocols work together to prevent spoofing. SPF validates sending servers, DKIM provides cryptographic message signing, and DMARC defines enforcement policies. Full implementation significantly reduces phishing effectiveness.