
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Danger strong hits: 127 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 50 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 19 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 66 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 378 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 970 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 20 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 68 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 89 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 49 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 21 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 72 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 69 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 65 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 73 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 38 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 18 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| UA bot: Go-http-client | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 209.87.169.136: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Block scanning from 209.87.169.136: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
IP 209.87.169.136 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
209.87.169.136 has been assigned a threat score of 255/100 (Critical). This is a critical-level threat. Systems administrators should treat this IP as hostile and block all inbound connections without exception.
The following attack categories were identified:
Threat intelligence analysis has linked 209.87.169.136 to malicious activity originating from Jersey City, United States, operating on the network of Clouvider Limited. The address has been under observation since its initial detection. The address has been active for 13 days in our monitoring system, producing 10 flagged requests at a rate of ~0.8/day. Operating from a residential network, this IP may represent a compromised home gateway or IoT device that has been drafted into a larger attack infrastructure. With 3 different attack patterns detected, this IP exhibits behavior characteristic of advanced automated scanning frameworks. Our records show 216 malicious IPs originating from United States, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. At 255/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Automated response systems can block threats in milliseconds, far faster than human analysts. However, automation requires careful safeguards — rate limits on blocking actions, automatic expiration, and human review queues prevent automated systems from causing self-inflicted outages.