IP Threat Report
203.159.81.93
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
Geolocation & Classification
Detection Signatures
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Danger strong hits: 99 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 9 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 31 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 69 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 186 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger strong hits: 89 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 219 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 32 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Observed Activity
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Timeline
Network Provider
Recommendations
Actions taken & recommended
- IP 203.159.81.93 is blocked at application level (HTTP 403)
- Consider blocking at firewall level (iptables/CSF) to reduce server load
- Other malicious IPs detected in the same /24 subnet — consider blocking 203.159.81.0/24
- Report abuse to the network provider via their abuse contact
- Ensure sensitive files (.env, .git, backups) are not accessible from the web
🤖 User-Agent Anomaly Defense
IP 203.159.81.93 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
🌊 Traffic Flood Defense
IP 203.159.81.93 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
Neighbors in 203.159.81.0/24
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
Blacklist Status (DNSBL)
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
Threat Analysis
203.159.81.93 has been assigned a threat score of 255/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
📊 Threat Analysis
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 203.159.81.93, geolocated to Tel Aviv, IL, operating on the network of F.N.S. HOLDINGS LIMITED, as a source of suspicious network activity. Over a period of 1 days, this IP generated 3 malicious requests, averaging approximately 3 requests per day. This IP is identified as a VPN or proxy endpoint, commonly used to mask the true origin of attack traffic and bypass geographic or reputation-based blocking. The dual attack vectors of User-Agent Anomaly combined with Request Flooding indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. IL currently accounts for 101 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. A score of 255/100 places this address in the top tier of severity. Block and investigate any historical connections.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Related Threats
Security Intelligence
💡 TLS Fingerprinting (JA3/JA4)
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
💡 DNS Amplification Attack Mechanics
DNS amplification exploits open resolvers to reflect and amplify traffic toward victims. A small query triggers a large response directed at the spoofed source IP, achieving amplification factors of 50x or more, overwhelming target bandwidth.