
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 37 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 326 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 57 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 171 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 46 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 156 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 50 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 489 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 58 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 197 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 62 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 200 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 56 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 166 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 66 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 70 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 20.91.251.70: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Block scanning from 20.91.251.70: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
IP 20.91.251.70 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
20.91.251.70 has been assigned a threat score of 265/100 (Critical). This is a critical-level threat. Systems administrators should treat this IP as hostile and block all inbound connections without exception.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 20.91.251.70, geolocated to Gävle, Sweden, operating on the network of Microsoft Corporation, as a source of suspicious network activity. Our sensors captured 9 malicious requests from this address across a 1-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~9 requests per day. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. The diversity of 3 separate attack methods suggests a comprehensive attack toolkit — likely an automated scanner that tests for vulnerabilities across multiple categories. Our records show 102 malicious IPs originating from Sweden, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. With a threat score of 265/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Examining HTTP headers beyond User-Agent reveals attack tools and automated scripts. Missing standard headers, unusual ordering, non-standard values, and inconsistencies with claimed client identity all serve as reliable detection signals.
Immutable, offline backups remain the most effective defense against ransomware. The 3-2-1 rule — three copies on two media types with one offsite — combined with regular recovery testing ensures business continuity after encryption attacks.