
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 23 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 177 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Burst: 22 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 68 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 92 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 704 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 48 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 174 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 143 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 881 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 24 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 82 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 46 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 352 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 75 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 83 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 529 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 77 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 20.43.20.252: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
IP 20.43.20.252 is enumerating directories. Configure fail2ban apache-404 jail after 10+ 404 errors. Disable directory listings. Normalize all 404 responses.
IP 20.43.20.252 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
20.43.20.252 has been assigned a threat score of 280/100 (Critical). This places it in the critical threat category. Immediate blocking is strongly advised across all network perimeters.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 20.43.20.252 has been traced to Toronto, Canada, operating on the network of Microsoft Corporation. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. Over a period of 1 days, this IP generated 5 malicious requests, averaging approximately 5 requests per day. Classified as a hosting IP, this address likely runs on a rented server or cloud instance. Attackers prefer datacenter IPs for their high bandwidth and disposable nature. With 3 different attack patterns detected, this IP exhibits behavior characteristic of advanced automated scanning frameworks. Canada currently accounts for 101 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. A score of 280/100 places this address in the top tier of severity. Block and investigate any historical connections.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
IPs originating from data centers and hosting providers account for a disproportionate amount of malicious traffic. Compromised VPS instances, bulletproof hosting, and abused trial accounts create persistent attack infrastructure that can be difficult to shut down.