
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 128 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 304 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 24 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 85 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 192 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 306 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 23 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 84 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 111 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 204 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 86 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 88 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 20.220.146.203 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
Block scanning from 20.220.146.203: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 20.220.146.203.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
20.220.146.203 has been assigned a threat score of 280/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
20.220.146.203 is registered in Toronto, Canada, operating on the network of Microsoft Corporation. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 6 flagged requests at a rate of ~6/day. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. With 3 different attack patterns detected, this IP exhibits behavior characteristic of advanced automated scanning frameworks. Canada currently accounts for 114 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. A score of 280/100 places this address in the top tier of severity. Block and investigate any historical connections.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
CDNs can inadvertently mask the true origin of malicious traffic, making attribution difficult. Attackers abuse CDN services to proxy their attacks, leverage cached content for amplification, and exploit misconfigurations in CDN-to-origin connections.