
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger strong hits: 15 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 43 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 23 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 51 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 24 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 14 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 41 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 52 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Danger strong hits: 22 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 40 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 53 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 36 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 81 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger strong hits: 9 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 33 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 38 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 19 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 48 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 56 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 22 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 17 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 53 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 20.220.13.5 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
IP 20.220.13.5 is enumerating directories. Configure fail2ban apache-404 jail after 10+ 404 errors. Disable directory listings. Normalize all 404 responses.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
20.220.13.5 has been assigned a threat score of 255/100 (Critical). This represents a critical risk level. Our detection systems have flagged multiple high-confidence indicators of malicious intent from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 20.220.13.5, geolocated to Toronto, Canada, operating on the network of Microsoft Corporation, as a source of suspicious network activity. During its 1-day observation window, we recorded 115 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 115 per day on average. Classified as a hosting IP, this address likely runs on a rented server or cloud instance. Attackers prefer datacenter IPs for their high bandwidth and disposable nature. The dual attack vectors of Request Flooding combined with Path Enumeration indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. Our records show 103 malicious IPs originating from Canada, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. At 255/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.
Effective rate limiting must balance protection against abuse with allowing legitimate traffic bursts. Sliding window algorithms, token buckets, and adaptive thresholds based on client reputation provide layered defense against flooding attacks.