
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 18 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 188 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 40 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 106 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 36 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 112 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 49 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 136 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 111 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 31 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 93 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 21 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 356 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 41 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 122 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 20.100.197.53 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 20.100.197.53.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
Network reconnaissance data from Shodan. Open ports may indicate running services, misconfigurations, or potential attack surfaces.
| Port | Service | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 443 | HTTPS | Low | HTTPS web server — encrypted web traffic |
Data source: Shodan InternetDB. Scanned independently of abuse.mom.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
20.100.197.53 has been assigned a threat score of 245/100 (Critical). This places it in the critical threat category. Immediate blocking is strongly advised across all network perimeters.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 20.100.197.53, geolocated to Lorenskog, Norway, operating on the network of Microsoft Corporation, as a source of suspicious network activity. Over a period of 1 days, this IP generated 6 malicious requests, averaging approximately 6 requests per day. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. Two attack patterns were identified (User-Agent Anomaly and Request Flooding), suggesting a semi-automated campaign that targets multiple vulnerabilities. With 108 flagged addresses, Norway represents a significant presence in our threat database. With a threat score of 245/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
DNS amplification exploits open resolvers to reflect and amplify traffic toward victims. A small query triggers a large response directed at the spoofed source IP, achieving amplification factors of 50x or more, overwhelming target bandwidth.