
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Directory Scan | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +0 | |
| DDoS / Flood | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +0 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block 194.33.39.196 at the network perimeter. Implement defense-in-depth combining IP blocking with application-layer protections.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
194.33.39.196 has been assigned a threat score of 130/100 (Critical). This represents a critical risk level. Our detection systems have flagged multiple high-confidence indicators of malicious intent from this address.
The address 194.33.39.196 originates from Moscow, Russia, operating on the network of Moshonkin Ilia Sergeevich. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. Over a period of 1 days, this IP generated 159 malicious requests, averaging approximately 159 requests per day. This IP is identified as a VPN or proxy endpoint, commonly used to mask the true origin of attack traffic and bypass geographic or reputation-based blocking. Our records show 114 malicious IPs originating from Russia, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. At 130/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
Watering hole attacks compromise websites frequently visited by target organizations. Rather than attacking targets directly, adversaries infect trusted resources, exploiting the inherent trust users place in regularly visited sites.