
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 193.19.109.204 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
193.19.109.204 has been assigned a threat score of 75/100 (High). This classifies it as a high-severity threat. Proactive blocking is recommended for sensitive infrastructure.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 193.19.109.204, geolocated to Seattle, United States, operating on the network of F.N.S. HOLDINGS LIMITED, as a source of suspicious network activity. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 1 flagged requests at a rate of ~1/day. The address operates as a VPN/proxy exit node. Attackers route traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their real location and evade IP-based security controls. Detected suspicious User-Agent anomalies including empty, forged, or rapidly rotating UA strings — characteristic of automated scanning tools. With 151 flagged addresses, United States represents a significant presence in our threat database. At 75/100, this IP warrants immediate defensive action.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Examining HTTP headers beyond User-Agent reveals attack tools and automated scripts. Missing standard headers, unusual ordering, non-standard values, and inconsistencies with claimed client identity all serve as reliable detection signals.
SSH servers face constant brute force attacks targeting common usernames and weak passwords. Key-based authentication, fail2ban, non-standard ports, and IP allowlisting dramatically reduce the attack surface. Monitoring auth logs reveals active campaigns and compromised credentials.