
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA bot: Go-http-client | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 | |
| Danger strong hits: 6 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 6 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| Danger strong hits: 10 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Burst: 10 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 10 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 193.180.212.163: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Block scanning from 193.180.212.163: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 193.180.212.163.
Network reconnaissance data from Shodan. Open ports may indicate running services, misconfigurations, or potential attack surfaces.
| Port | Service | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | SSH | Low | Secure Shell — common brute force target for remote access |
| 25 | SMTP | Medium | SMTP mail server — can be abused for spam relay |
| 80 | HTTP | Low | HTTP web server — standard web traffic |
| 443 | HTTPS | Low | HTTPS web server — encrypted web traffic |
| 465 | Unknown | Low | Service on port 465 |
| 587 | Unknown | Low | Service on port 587 |
| 993 | IMAPS | Low | Service on port 993 |
| 2002 | Unknown | Low | Service on port 2002 |
| 2003 | Unknown | Low | Service on port 2003 |
| CVE ID | Link |
|---|---|
| CVE-2024-25117 | NVD → |
| CVE-2007-3205 | NVD → |
| CVE-2013-2220 | NVD → |
| CVE-2022-4900 | NVD → |
| CVE-2024-3566 | NVD → |
| CVE-2024-5458 | NVD → |
🔴 Security scanning identified 6 vulnerability entries on this host. Multiple vulnerabilities suggest gaps in patch management. Consult NVD advisories for details.
Data source: Shodan InternetDB. Scanned independently of abuse.mom.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
193.180.212.163 has been assigned a threat score of 235/100 (Critical). This is a critical-level threat. Systems administrators should treat this IP as hostile and block all inbound connections without exception.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 193.180.212.163, geolocated to Nørre Åby, DK, operating on the network of Webdock.io ApS, as a source of suspicious network activity. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 4 flagged requests at a rate of ~4/day. This residential IP is likely a compromised consumer device. Home routers and IoT equipment with default credentials are prime targets for botnet operators. The diversity of 3 separate attack methods suggests a comprehensive attack toolkit — likely an automated scanner that tests for vulnerabilities across multiple categories. DK currently accounts for 39 blocked IPs in our database, making it a notable source of malicious traffic. At 235/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
When multiple IPs in a subnet show malicious behavior, subnet blocking efficiently neutralizes the threat. However, overly broad blocking risks impacting legitimate users. Analysis of subnet ownership and historical behavior guides appropriate blocking scope.