
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Danger medium hits: 5 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +50 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| Probe 302→404 | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 193.163.207.121: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
193.163.207.121 has been assigned a threat score of 95/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 193.163.207.121 has been traced to Amsterdam, Netherlands, operating on the network of Alex Largman. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. Our sensors captured 584 malicious requests from this address across a 5-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~116.8 requests per day. The address operates as a VPN/proxy exit node. Attackers route traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their real location and evade IP-based security controls. Active path scanning has been detected — this IP probes for hundreds of common file and directory names. At 95/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
SSRF attacks trick servers into making requests to internal resources that should not be publicly accessible. This can expose cloud metadata endpoints, internal APIs, and private network services, potentially leading to full infrastructure compromise.
Insecure file upload functionality allows attackers to upload web shells, malware, or scripts that execute on the server. Proper validation must check file content, not just extensions, and uploaded files should be stored outside the web root.