
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 192.253.209.138: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
192.253.209.138 has been assigned a threat score of 75/100 (High). This classifies it as a high-severity threat. Proactive blocking is recommended for sensitive infrastructure.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 192.253.209.138 originates from Jersey City, United States, operating on the network of GSL Networks Pty LTD. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. During its 1-day observation window, we recorded 1 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 1 per day on average. The address operates as a VPN/proxy exit node. Attackers route traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their real location and evade IP-based security controls. The IP exhibits User-Agent manipulation, switching between different browser identities or sending empty headers. United States currently accounts for 152 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. At 75/100, this IP warrants immediate defensive action.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
IPs originating from data centers and hosting providers account for a disproportionate amount of malicious traffic. Compromised VPS instances, bulletproof hosting, and abused trial accounts create persistent attack infrastructure that can be difficult to shut down.