
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA bot: Go-http-client | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 | |
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 6 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| Burst: 8 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 11 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 11 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Burst: 5 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 1 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +25 | |
| Danger medium hits: 19 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 12 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 21 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Burst: 15 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 16 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 13 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 18.191.25.43 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
Block scanning from 18.191.25.43: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 18.191.25.43.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
18.191.25.43 has been assigned a threat score of 180/100 (Critical). This is a critical-level threat. Systems administrators should treat this IP as hostile and block all inbound connections without exception.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 18.191.25.43 originates from Dublin, United States, operating on the network of Amazon.com, Inc.. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. Our sensors captured 28 malicious requests from this address across a 1-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~28 requests per day. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. The combination of 3 distinct attack vectors indicates a sophisticated, multi-pronged threat actor deploying automated tools that probe multiple attack surfaces simultaneously. With 130 flagged addresses, United States represents a significant presence in our threat database. At 180/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Examining HTTP headers beyond User-Agent reveals attack tools and automated scripts. Missing standard headers, unusual ordering, non-standard values, and inconsistencies with claimed client identity all serve as reliable detection signals.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.