
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burst 11/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 7/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 11 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger strong hits: 10 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| UA bot: Go-http-client | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
We have detected 358 malicious IPs from this autonomous system.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 178.92.103.218.
Address UA spoofing from 178.92.103.218: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
178.92.103.218 has been assigned a threat score of 270/100 (Critical). This places it in the critical threat category. Immediate blocking is strongly advised across all network perimeters.
The following attack categories were identified:
178.92.103.218 is registered in Kyiv, Ukraine, operating on the network of GSL Networks Pty LTD. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. During its 1-day observation window, we recorded 12 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 12 per day on average. This IP is identified as a VPN or proxy endpoint, commonly used to mask the true origin of attack traffic and bypass geographic or reputation-based blocking. The dual attack vectors of Request Flooding combined with User-Agent Anomaly indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. Ukraine currently accounts for 158 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. At 270/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
Buffer overflow vulnerabilities remain relevant in C/C++ applications despite decades of mitigation efforts. Modern protections like ASLR, stack canaries, and DEP reduce exploitability but determined attackers continue finding bypass techniques.