
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger strong hits: 1 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +25 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 178.43.252.226: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
178.43.252.226 has been assigned a threat score of 60/100 (High). This score indicates high threat severity. The IP has shown clear patterns of malicious behavior that warrant immediate defensive measures.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 178.43.252.226 has been traced to Krakow, Poland, operating on the network of Orange Polska Spolka Akcyjna. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 1 flagged requests at a rate of ~1/day. This is a residential IP address, suggesting a compromised home device such as a router, smart appliance, or infected workstation participating in a botnet. The IP exhibits directory enumeration behavior, systematically requesting non-existent paths to discover hidden files and misconfigured resources. Our records show 115 malicious IPs originating from Poland, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. The score of 60/100 warrants active monitoring and rate-limiting. Full blocking is advisable for sensitive systems.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
SSRF attacks trick servers into making requests to internal resources that should not be publicly accessible. This can expose cloud metadata endpoints, internal APIs, and private network services, potentially leading to full infrastructure compromise.
Botnet C2 infrastructure has evolved from centralized IRC channels to resilient peer-to-peer networks, domain generation algorithms, and blockchain-based communication. This evolution makes botnet takedowns increasingly difficult and expensive.