
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger medium hits: 2 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +20 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| UA suspicious | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
We have detected 7023 malicious IPs from this autonomous system.
Address UA spoofing from 178.128.227.95: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
178.128.227.95 has been assigned a threat score of 85/100 (Critical). This places it in the critical threat category. Immediate blocking is strongly advised across all network perimeters.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 178.128.227.95, geolocated to Toronto, Canada, operating on the network of DigitalOcean, LLC, as a source of suspicious network activity. Our sensors captured 32 malicious requests from this address across a 1-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~32 requests per day. Operating from datacenter infrastructure, this IP is typical of addresses used in organized attack operations. Cloud and VPS providers are commonly exploited as launching platforms for automated scanning. The IP exhibits User-Agent manipulation, switching between different browser identities or sending empty headers. With 2,585 flagged addresses, Canada represents a major presence in our threat database. The score of 85/100 indicates a confirmed malicious actor. Network-level blocking is appropriate.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
SSRF attacks trick servers into making requests to internal resources that should not be publicly accessible. This can expose cloud metadata endpoints, internal APIs, and private network services, potentially leading to full infrastructure compromise.
Email authentication protocols work together to prevent spoofing. SPF validates sending servers, DKIM provides cryptographic message signing, and DMARC defines enforcement policies. Full implementation significantly reduces phishing effectiveness.