
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Burst: 5 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 178.105.44.203: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
IP 178.105.44.203 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
178.105.44.203 has been assigned a threat score of 60/100 (High). At this threat level, the IP is considered high risk. Firewall rules should be updated to deny traffic from this source.
The following attack categories were identified:
Network traffic from 178.105.44.203, located in Nuremberg, Germany, operating on the network of Hetzner Online GmbH, has been classified as malicious by our automated threat scoring engine. Our sensors captured 3 malicious requests from this address across a 1-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~3 requests per day. This address belongs to a datacenter or cloud hosting provider. Hosting IPs are frequently leveraged by threat actors who rent cheap VPS instances specifically for conducting attacks. The dual attack vectors of User-Agent Anomaly combined with Request Flooding indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. Our records show 163 malicious IPs originating from Germany, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. At 60/100, this IP presents a meaningful threat. Implement rate limiting with escalation to blocking.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
VPN exit nodes aggregate traffic from many users, creating mixed reputation profiles. While legitimate users seek privacy, attackers exploit VPN services to anonymize malicious activity, making IP-based blocking of VPN nodes a complex policy decision.